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Abstract 
Consistent with the predictions of rare disaster models, we find that a proxy for the time-
varying probability of rare disasters helps to explain fluctuations in expectations of the 
equity risk premium. Our proxy for disaster risk is a recently developed measure of global 
political instability, and the expected market risk premium is from Value Line analysts’ 
expected stock returns. Consistent with long-run risk models, uncertainty about expected 
GDP growth and expected consumption growth are also significantly positively related to 
the expected market risk premium. We obtain similar results when we use the earnings-
price ratio and the dividend-price ratio as proxies for the expected market risk premium. 
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1. Introduction 
The expected equity market risk premium is one of the key factors in asset pricing models 
and plays a central role in portfolio management and valuation. Since Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) challenged the finance profession with the “equity premium puzzle”, an extensive 
literature seeking explanations has emerged.  The main focus of this paper is on one of the 
potential explanations put forward – rare disaster risk. 
 
Rietz (1988) shows that a low probability of a disastrously large drop in consumption can 
generate an average equity premium that is substantially higher than predicted by the 
standard economic model in Mehra and Prescott (1985). When disaster strikes, the stock 
market will plummet whereas risk free bonds provide investors with certainty when it is 
most needed: during disasters. Rietz argues that because of the very high marginal utility 
of consumption during disasters, investors are willing to pay a premium for this disaster-
insurance. That is, they are willing to accept a much lower return on bonds than on stocks 
compared to what would be expected based on the traditional concept of risk.  
 
Barro (2006) derives a rare disasters asset pricing model and presents calibrations that use 
parameters based on three major contractions in gross domestic product (GDP): World 
War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. His results confirm the suggestion in Rietz 
(1988) that the high observed equity premium can be explained by rare disasters. Further 
theoretical development in Gabaix (2012) also shows a how time-varying probability of 
rare disasters has the potential to explain several longstanding puzzles in economics and 
finance.  
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While promising in theory, empirical verification of disaster-based models is far from 
straightforward. An obvious problem is that rare disasters are infrequent, making robust 
empirical analysis difficult. Berkman at al. (2011) develop a time-varying global political 
instability measure to overcome this problem. They relate their rare disaster risk measure 
to realized stock market returns and find that an increase in rare disaster risk lowers 
contemporary world stock market returns and raises volatility. They also show that the 
crisis risk is priced: Industries that are more crisis-sensitive yield higher returns. They, 
however, fail to find support for one of the key predictions of rare disaster models: a 
positive relation between expected market returns and disaster probability. 
 
Bansal and Yaron (2004) propose another potential resolution of the equity premium 
puzzle. They show that a model with consumption and dividend growth rates containing a 
small long-run predictable component and fluctuating volatility can justify the observed 
magnitude of equity premium. In a related strand of literature, researchers also show that 
aggregate stock market returns can be predicted with observable variables such as the 
conditional volatility of returns (French et al., 1987) and interest rates (Campbell, 1987). 
 
The theoretical models of the expected market risk premium discussed so far yield 
predictions about investors’ expected returns. Empirical tests of the models typically proxy 
expected returns with realized returns. However, the use of realized returns is subject to 
criticism. For example, Brav et al. (2005) argue that realized returns are likely to be a noisy 
proxy in the presence of information surprises that do not cancel out over the period and 
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complex learning effects.  Following Brav et al. (2005), we re-examine the predictions of 
several models of the expected market risk premium with a more direct measure of 
expected returns based on the predictions of Value Line analysts. The use of this analyst-
based measure immediately raises the question whether this is a valid proxy for the true 
market expectation. For example, it is documented that analysts exhibit optimism bias 
(Rajan and Servaes, 1997) and conflict of interest bias (Michaely and Womack, 1999). In 
addition, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) conclude that return expectations from six 
different data sources are not consistent with a rational expectations representative investor 
model. While we cannot completely address the concern that Value Line analysts’ 
expected stock returns are subject to similar problems, there are some features that could 
lessen the concern. First, we observe that our expected market risk premium measure is 
positively correlated with the dividend-price ratio (correlation = 0.78). In contrast, 
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) find significantly negative correlations between the six 
expected return measures they consider and the dividend-price ratio and present this result 
as one of the reasons to conclude that their expected market return measures do not accord 
with rational expectations models. Second, the Value Line price estimates are from 
professional analysts who work for an independent research institution and thus are less 
likely to be affected by systematic bias. Finally, Value Line charges its subscribers for the 
service. This suggests that the subscribers value the service and are likely to incorporate 
the forecasts when they make investment decisions.  
 
We find strong evidence that suggests that Value Line analysts expect higher returns in the 
face of heightened global political uncertainty. Figure 1 illustrates the main finding of our 
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paper. It plots the expected market risk premium based on Value Line analysts’ forecasts 
against previous month’s global political instability measure over the period 1975 through 
2001. 
 
      [Figure 1 here] 
 
The correlation between the two annual series in Figure 1 is 0.50 (p-value is 0.006), and 
at a monthly frequency the correlation is 0.33 (p-value of 0.001). This highly significant 
correlation confirms the main prediction in time-varying disaster risk models: investors’ 
expected return on stocks relative to bonds is high when the probability of disasters is high 
(see, for example, Gabaix, 2012, Wachter, 2009, and Gourio, 2008). We also find that a 
one standard-deviation increase in disaster risk raises the expected equity premium by 1% 
after accounting for the effects of all the other variables in the model. 
 
In addition to the significant relation with disaster risk, we find that the expected market 
risk premium is significantly positively related to fluctuations in uncertainty about 
expected GDP growth and expected consumption growth, consistent with long-run risk 
models (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Bansal and Shaliastovich, 2010). Our regression 
estimates suggest that a one standard-deviation increase in uncertainty about economic 
growth increases the expected equity premium by 1.7%. Our results also indicate that our 
proxy for expected market risk premium is positively related to the term spread and the 
default spread. The model that includes all the explanatory variables explains about 44% 
of the time-variation in the expected market premium. 
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In additional tests, we use popular valuation ratios such as earnings-price ratio (E/P) and 
dividend-price ratio (D/P) as proxies for expected returns (see Fama and French, 2002, for 
example). Consistent with the results based on the analysts-based expected market risk 
premium, we document that political risk is an important determinant of E/P and D/P over 
a long sample period from 1918 to 2007. Our evidence that valuation ratios vary with the 
perceived political instability, extends the literature on determinants of the valuation ratios 
(see, for example, Fairfield, 2000, Jain and Rosett, 2006, and Zorn et al., 2009) and should 
be considered when these ratios (or their reciprocals) are used as a measure of stock 
valuation or mispricing (see, for example, White, 2000, and Weinstein, 1988).  
 
Our contribution to the literature is as follows. First, consistent with the predictions of rare 
disaster models, we show that our analyst-based measure of expected return is positively 
related to political disaster risk. Second, using the same analyst-based measure for 
expected returns, we also find support for long-run risk models. Finally, we show that our 
main conclusions still hold if we use E/P and D/P as proxies for expected returns.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the variables and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. We conclude in Section 4. 
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1. Crisis severity index and expected returns 
2.1. Crisis severity index1 
Our source for international political crisis events is the International Crisis Behavior 
database (ICB) that contains detailed information on 455 international military-security 
crises since the end of World War I.2 The database provides a comprehensive set of 
information about each crisis including the trigger, characteristics of the ensuing conflict, 
superpower involvement, and the outcome. Its attention to triggers of crises is an attractive 
feature as it enables us to date the events that would have changed the perceived 
probabilities of crises. For example, a crisis was triggered by Iraq’s deployment of troops 
near its border with Kuwait on 7 October 1994, which the US perceived as a grave threat. 
On 10 October, President Clinton spoke with the leaders of the UK, France, Russia, Egypt, 
and Turkey, seeking support for military action against Iraq, if necessary, which led Iraq 
to withdraw its forces from the Kuwaiti border. This crisis ended on 10 November when 
Iraq’s National Assembly formally declared Iraq’s recognition of the sovereignty of the 
state of Kuwait.  
 
The main test in our paper relates our proxy for the expected market risk premium to global 
political instability. To that end, we proxy the disaster probability with the number of 
starting and on-going crises in each period. Some crises are more damaging than others. 
We expect that more severe crises are associated with higher disaster probabilities and will 
have a stronger impact on investors’ expectations. In order to reflect the gravity, we use 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on section 2 in Berkman et al. (2011). 
2 An extensive discussion of the database can be found in Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997). See also 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/ for an overview of studies that employed the ICB data. 
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indicators for six severity dimensions - whether or not a crisis started with violence, 
violence used during the crisis, full-scale wars, gravity of value threat, whether the crisis 
is part of a protracted conflict, and great power or superpower involvement.3 We then 
assign each crisis a score of 1 to 7, by aggregating the six indicator values and adding 1 
for being a crisis. For example, a crisis that started with violence and has great power 
involvement has a score of 3 - 1 for being a crisis, 1 for starting with violence and 1 for 
having great power involvement. We construct a monthly crisis severity index (CSI) by 
adding the scores of all crises starting and on-going in each month.4 
 
A brief discussion of recent history shows how our measure of global political instability 
in Figure 1 reflects the actual global political climate during the sample period of our main 
tests, from 1975 to 2001. The world is relatively stable at the start of our sample period in 
1975, although there are several conflicts between the superpowers in the Middle-East, 
Ethiopia and Angola. Crises flare up again at the end of the 1970s when the Soviet invaded 
Afghanistan. Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 marked 
the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 stirred up 
a few crises - e.g., crises involving North Korea, crises in and around the Balkans, and 
crises in the Caucasus. However, with the US as the only remaining superpower, the 
number of international crises declined noticeably. Nevertheless, several major crises did 
erupt in the post Soviet Union era such as the Taiwan Strait conflicts, the Gulf War, 
                                                 
3 The dummy variable Grave threat equals 1 if the value threat involves a territorial threat, a threat of 
grave damage, or a threat to existence 
4 See Berkman et al. (2011) for a further description of the index and its construction. 
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conflicts between Israel and neighboring countries, and crises stemming from terrorist 
attacks by the Al Qaeda network. 
 
[Table 1 Here] 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the crisis variables in our sample period. An 
average month sees roughly 2.2 crises. The maximum number of international crises that 
begin in a particular month is four. The maximum number of crises that ended in a given 
month is also four. The CSI ranges from 0 to 28 and reaches its maximum in February 
1979. The worst crises to start in our sample period had a crisis severity level of 6. These 
crises include 9/11, the Gulf War of 1990, several crises during the Iran/Iraq war (1980–
88), and the Mayaguez crisis that began on 12 May 1975, when a US-registered cargo ship, 
the Mayaguez, was seized off Cambodian coastal waters by the Khmer Rouge. 
 
The column in Table 1 with the heading ‘Sum’ shows that out of a total of 215 crises that 
started in our sample period, 106 began with a violent break, 96 involved serious violence, 
and 36 were full-scale wars. There are 106 crises that involved threats to the most basic 
values during some portion of the crisis. In 22 of the crises, at least one major power was 
involved in the conflict, and 126 crises were part of a protracted conflict. The correlation 
between crisis variables is high and always significant at the 1% level (not reported). For 
example, crises that begin with a violent act (Violent start) tend to result in crises exhibiting 
either serious clashes or full-scale wars (Violent and War). 
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2.2. Expected return measure 
A popular proxy for expected stock returns is the one-period ahead realized returns. 
However, a growing body of literature emphasizes that realized returns are a noisy proxy 
for expected returns and calls for alternative proxies (see, for example, Elton, 1999, and 
Fama and French, 2002). 
 
As an illustration, Figure 2 plots the (annualized) realized market risk premium (CRSP 
value-weighted stock market return in excess of the 30-day T-bill rate) against the expected 
level of global political instability. In contrast to the positive correlation between global 
political instability and the expected market risk premium in Figure 1, the correlation 
between the realized market risk premium and global political instability in Figure 2 is 
negative and insignificant at -0.25 (p-value = 0.20). Thus, global political instability has 
no predictive power for one-month-ahead realized returns. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Paying heed to the call for alternative proxies for expected returns, we use expected return 
data compiled in Brav et al. (2005).5 The database provides annualized expected returns 
for individual stocks and is available on a monthly basis for the period January 1975–
December 2001. The expected returns are based on target prices and dividend forecasts 
from Value Line, an independent research provider with no affiliation to investment 
                                                 
5 These data are downloadable from Reuven Lehavy’s web page: 
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/rlehavy/VLdata.htm. We thank the authors for making the data available. 
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banking. Value Line covers approximately 3,800 stocks, comprising 92% of the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ in terms of market value. 
 
To obtain expected returns, Brav et al. (2005) use the price Value Line expects to prevail 
in four years’ time (the target price). To this price, they add expected dividends based on 
Value Line analysts’ forecasts for both dividend growth rates and next-year dividends. 
With these inputs, expected return is defined as the rate of return that equates the current 
market price of a stock to the present value of the target price and future dividends. Value 
Line analyzes each company on a quarterly cycle, but different stocks have different cycles 
such that expected return estimates are available for every month of the 27-year sample 
period. 
 
To obtain expected annual excess returns, we subtract one-year constant maturity T-bill 
rates (from the public website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED) from 
analysts’ expected stock returns. Descriptive statistics for the Value Line expected return 
data are in Table 2, along with the yearly averages of monthly expected excess returns 
used in Figure 1. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
There is a significant variation in the annual value-weighted averages of expected equity 
premium, ranging from 3.21% to 20.01%. Brav et al. (2005) report a positive cross-
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sectional correlation between the expected return and leverage (not reported) suggesting 
that the expected returns exhibit “reasonable” model-free properties. 
 
2.3. Other variables 
In our empirical model of the expected equity premium, we include several well-known 
variables that have been shown to be related to this premium either theoretically or 
empirically. The first of these variables is based on the intertemporal CAPM model of 
Merton (1973), which posits a positive relation between market volatility and the market 
risk premium. To obtain a conditional market volatility measure, we follow French et al. 
(1987) and use the time-series of conditional forecasts of the realized return standard 
deviation.6 We first estimate the month-t variance of returns as the sum of the squared 
daily returns on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio plus twice the sum of the products of 
adjacent returns, 
𝜎𝑚𝑡
2 =∑𝑟𝑖𝑡
2
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
+ 2 ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑖+1,𝑡
𝑁𝑡−1
𝑖=1
 
where Nt is the number of daily returns rit in month t. We then estimate an ARIMA (0,1,3) 
model for the log of 𝜎𝑚𝑡  using all available observations from CRSP. Our conditional 
volatility measure for each month is defined as the predicted value for that month from the 
ARIMA model. 
 
                                                 
6 There is a substantial body of literature studying the risk-return relationship of ICAPM utilizing various 
conditional volatility measures. We present results with one of the most well-known volatility measures.  In 
unreported analyses, we employ implied volatility (VXO), available from 1985 onwards, as a conditional 
volatility measure and find similar results. 
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The second set of variables is motivated by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010), who propose 
a long-run risk model where expected stock returns depend on investor estimates of 
expected growth and confidence about these estimates. Adopting the methodology of 
Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010), we directly estimate investors’ expected growth and 
confidence from the cross-section of forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(SPF), available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Specifically, for each 
quarter, we proxy the expected growth rate in GDP with the average of next year’s (four 
quarters ahead) forecast growth rates. Uncertainty in the average forecast is estimated by 
dividing the cross-sectional variance of the forecast annual growth rates at each point in 
time by the number of forecasts.7 
 
We also include an alternative measure of fundamental economic uncertainty based on 
consumption volatility. To obtain this measure, we first collect quarterly data on 
consumption of non-durables and services from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) accounts, Section 1. Next, we estimate the following AR(1) specification 
for consumption growth, 
𝑔𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝑎1𝑔𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡. 
Following Bansal et al. (2005), the consumption volatility measure is computed as, 𝜎𝑐,𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔(∑ |𝜀𝑐,𝑡−𝑗|
4
𝑗=1 ). 
 
                                                 
7 While Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010) use one-quarter-ahead forecasts, we use forecasts for yearly GDP 
growth rates to align the forecast period with that of our primary expected return measure, i.e., Value Line 
analysts’ annual expected returns. Replacing annual GDP forecasts with one-quarter-ahead forecasts does 
not materially alter our results.  
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We also consider a set of predictor variables used in Ang and Bekaert (2007) and Campbell 
(1987), among others. We obtain monthly data for the stochastically detrended risk-free 
rate (the three-month secondary market T-bill rate minus its backward twelve-month 
moving average), the default spread between Moody’s BAA and AAA corporate bond 
yields, and the term spread, defined as the difference between the six-month T-bill rate and 
the three-month T-bill rate (from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
 
For analyses using monthly estimates of the market risk premium, we match the most 
recently released observation with the monthly expected return. For example, the SPF data 
are released in the second month of each quarter and are matched with the three monthly 
return observations starting from the third month of the quarter. Other quarterly data are 
assumed to be available at the end of the quarter and are merged with the monthly 
observations in the following quarter. Summary statistics for the variables over the sample 
period of 1975–2001 are presented in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The last column of Panel A in Table 3 reports the p-values from Phillips-Perron unit root 
tests. The null hypothesis of a unit root is strongly rejected for all the variables. In Panel 
B, the correlation between the analyst-based expected market risk premium and the CSI at 
monthly frequency is 0.33. Consistent with long-run risk models, expected GDP 
uncertainty and consumption risk are both positively related to our expected return 
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measure. The CSI is significantly positively correlated with the stochastically detrended 
risk-free rate and consumption volatility. 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1. Main results 
In order to examine the relation between global political instability and expected market 
risk premium, we follow the return prediction literature and use linear regressions of 
expected returns on different sets of lagged explanatory variables. We assume that 
investors form expectations about global political instability based on the observed level 
of the CSI in the previous month.8 Since analysts can update their expectations in response 
to new information expected returns (which relate to the next four years) do not necessarily 
mechanically overlap, even if forecasting periods do. However, to the extent that the 
information set does not change completely, successive monthly expected returns are 
unlikely to be independent.9 Following previous studies, we use Newey-West standard 
errors to address the serial correlation (see, for example, Campbell, 1987, and Bansal et 
al., 2005).10  
 
[Table 4 here] 
                                                 
8 An earlier version of the paper used the expected level of CSI estimated from an AR(1) process and 
documented qualitatively similar results. Lagged CSI used in this paper can be considered a special case of 
an AR(1) process. However it does not suffer from the “generated regressor” problem. We thank the 
anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
9 We thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
10 Caution is warranted though as there are concerns whether this is a valid way of dealing with overlapping 
observations. For example, Ang and Begaert (2007), report that the use of Hodrick (1992) standard errors 
renders the predictability of realized returns weaker. Computing Hodrick (1992) standard error requires 
“reverse” regressions of short-run returns on the sum of the predictors over a long period. As we do not 
observe analysts’ expected returns over shorter periods, it is not feasible to calculate Hodrick standard errors, 
but as an alternative we also present bootstrap p-values.  
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Table 4 reports regression results for the monthly value-weighted Value Line expected 
returns in excess of one-year constant-maturity T-bill rates. In addition to t-statistics based 
on Newey-West standard errors, we report one-sided bootstrap p-values in brackets – the 
fraction of the bootstrapped estimates that are smaller (greater) than or equal to zero    when 
the relevant coefficient estimate from the regression is positive (negative) – in brackets.11  
 
The results in the first row show that expected market volatility has little impact on Value 
Line analysts’ forecast annual expected excess returns. The t-statistic is only 0.24 and the 
adjusted R2 is negative. These results do not support the Merton (1973) ICAPM consistent 
with previous empirical studies using realized returns that also document that the ICAPM 
risk and return trade-off is difficult to detect in the data (see, for example, Baillie and 
DeGennaro, 1990, Campbell and Hentschel, 1992, and Harvey, 2001). Adding the global 
political instability measure (row 2) greatly improves the fit of the model. The adjusted R2 
is now 0.10, and the coefficient on CSI t-1 is significantly positive (t-stat. = 2.87). These 
results are consistent with the main prediction of time-varying rare disaster models and 
suggest that investors demand a higher risk premium when disaster probability is high. 
The point estimate of the regression coefficient is 0.0032, which indicates that a one-
                                                 
11 The block bootstrapping covariance estimator is shown to provide heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard error for least squares (see Fitzenberger, 1997). For each iteration, we resample 
overlapping blocks of seven consecutive observations from the residuals with replacements.The block size 
of seven is based on T1/3 suggested in the literature (see Hall et al., 1995). Block sizes of 14 and 21 yield 
similar results. We then add these bootstrapped residuals to the fitted values and re-estimated the regression. 
We repeat the process 10,000 times in order to obtain bootstrapped distributions of coefficients.  
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standard-deviation increase in CSI (5.74) results in a 1.8% increase in the expected market 
risk premium. 
 
In rows 3–5 of Table 4, we report the estimates from regressions that include other 
predictor variables suggested in the literature. The inclusion of GDP forecast uncertainty 
and GDP growth is motivated by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010). The significantly 
positive coefficient on GDP uncertainty accords well with their long-run growth model. 
Row 4 shows that the relative T-bill rate, the term spread, and the default spread are all 
positively related to analyst-based expected stock market returns in excess of the one-year 
T-bill rate. These results are broadly consistent with the predictive regressions in 
Bollerslev et al. (2009). Finally, as in Bansal et al. (2005), consumption volatility is 
positively related to the Value Line expected return measure. Note that in all model 
specifications, the coefficient on CSI is positive and significant at the conventional 5% 
level. When we include all the explanatory variables in row 6, CSI is marginally significant 
with a t-statistic of 1.97. The estimated coefficient suggests that with all the other variables 
in place, other things being equal, a one-standard deviation increase in CSI (5.74) raises 
the expected return by 1%.  
 
Overall, there is supporting evidence for the notion that heightened global political 
instability increases the expected market risk premium. The results also suggest that 
analysts predict a higher expected equity premium in the presence of long-run risk. A one-
standard deviation increase in UNCt-1 (0.0871) leads to a 1.7% increase in expected return. 
As in the case of realized returns, expected returns are positively related to both the term 
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spread, TERMt-1, and the default spread, DEFt-1. Combined, the explanatory variables 
explain about 44% of the variation in analysts’ expected returns. 
  
3.2. Valuation ratios 
This section considers the results of tests with earnings-price and dividend-price ratios as 
alternative proxies for expected stock market returns. We obtain the data from Robert 
Shiller’s web page.12 E/P is defined as the trailing 10-year average of real earnings divided 
by the inflation adjusted S&P composite price (reciprocal of P/E10 or CAPE in the data). 
D/P is computed as real dividends over the previous year divided by the real price.  
 
We are not the first to employ the earnings-price ratio and the dividend-price ratio as 
proxies for expected returns. For example, Fama and French (2002) argue that because 
dividend and earnings growth are largely unpredictable, these ratios are effective proxies 
for expected stock returns. The results with the E/P and D/P as the dependent variable are 
reported in Table 5.13 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
For our analysis of the valuation ratios, we utilize all the observations available for each 
regression specification. We report the start date and the end date of the relevant sample 
period in the last two columns of Table 5 and note that these sample periods are 
                                                 
12 See http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. We thank Robert Shiller for making the data available. 
The results are similar when we use earnings averaged over previous one year instead of ten years. 
13 Bootstrap results are stronger than those based on Newey-West standard errors for all the regression 
results and are not reported for brevity.  
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considerably longer than the 1975-2001 period used in our previous tests with the Value 
Line expected returns. Despite this difference in sample periods, the results for the two 
valuation ratios in Table 5 are remarkably similar to those in Table 4. Most importantly, 
the regression coefficients on the CSI are positive and significant at the 5% level (with the 
exception of specification (6) with the E/P and specification (2) with the D/P as the 
dependent variable, where the CSI is marginally significant at the 10% level).  
 
The coefficient for expected market volatility is significantly positive for the longest 
sample period (Model 1), but becomes insignificant and even negative for sample periods 
that start after 1959 (Model 4). Consistent with the results in Table 4, GDP growth 
uncertainty, consumption volatility, and the three financial predictors are positively related 
to both E/P and D/P. These results are in line with Jain and Rosett (2006) and show that 
macroeconomic variables can explain the E/P. More importantly, these tests show that: i) 
the results in the previous section are not specific to the use of Value Line analysts’ 
expectations as proxy for market-wide expectations14; and ii) the results in the previous 
section are not limited to the period 1975–2001, but extend to the period 1928–2008. The 
results also suggest that the criticism of Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) does not apply to 
our measure of expected returns as we obtain similar results with the valuation ratios. 
 
                                                 
14 Our use of analyst forecasts in the previous section is subject to criticism that if analysts try to minimize 
the mean absolute forecast error, the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean (Gu and Wu, 
2003). In this case, the low probability of a rare disaster would not be included in analysts’ target price, 
biasing our estimate of the expected market risk premium. The results in Table 5 are not subject to this 
criticism. 
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3.3. Robustness tests  
3.3.1. Quarterly data  
 In the Value Line database, firms receive coverage only once per quarter and are therefore 
included in our value-weighted portfolio only once per quarter. One possible concern with 
our use of monthly data is that the firms that are covered in a particular month of each 
quarter are systematically different. We therefore repeat the analysis in Table 4 using 
quarterly value-weighted returns as dependent variable and all values for the explanatory 
variables measured at the beginning of each quarter. Table 6 presents the quarterly 
regression results. 
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
These results are very similar to those in Table 4 and stronger, if anything. As before, the 
CSI, the measures of macro-economic uncertainty, and the interest rate spreads are 
significantly positively related to the quarterly Value Line expected returns. 
3.3.2. Dynamics between CSI and economic variables 
Although the results so far indicate that there is a positive relation between the expected 
equity premium and political risk, a possible concern is that the CSI merely proxies for 
economic risk. For example, political leaders have been known to start external conflicts 
in order to divert attention from domestic economic woes.15 If this is the case, then the 
current CSI could be affected by the past realizations of economic variables. To examine 
                                                 
15 We thank the anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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this issue, we estimate bivariate vector autoregressive models with the CSI and the macro 
economic variables and run Granger causality tests.16 Table 7 presents the results.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
Overall, there is little evidence that the lagged economic variables cause the current CSI. 
All the F-statistics in column 3 of Table 7 are insignificant at the 10% level. If anything, 
there is evidence that the lagged CSI causes economic uncertainty. For all the other macro-
economic variables, the F-statistics are insignificant in column 5 of Table 7 suggesting 
that the CSI does not Granger-cause them, either. 
 
4. Conclusion 
One of the fundamental predictions of rare disaster models is a positive intertemporal 
relation between disaster probability and the expected market risk premium. We 
empirically test this link using a measure of global political instability and Value Line 
analysts’ expected rates of return. Consistent with the predictions of rare disaster models, 
global political instability is positively correlated with expected excess stock market return 
based on analysts’ forecasts and with valuation ratios (E/P and D/P). We also find support 
for long-run risk models; uncertainty about expected GDP growth and expected 
consumption growth are significantly positively related to the expected market risk 
premium and valuation ratios. Interest rate spreads, which have been shown to be 
                                                 
16 VAR results are sensitive to the selection of lag lengths. In order to select the lag length that best fit the 
data, we examine four goodness-of-fit measures - Akaike information criterion, Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion, final prediction error, and Schwarz criterion. When there is an equal division among the 
measures, we pick the shorter length. 
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predictors of realized returns in the literature, affect analysts’ expected returns in a similar 
fashion.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of crisis variables 
 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Sum 
Crises 2.24 1.50 0 8 996 
Start 0.48 0.72 0 4 215 
End 0.48 0.72 0 4 213 
      
CSI 7.75 5.44 0 28 3448 
Start CSI 1.59 2.57 0 13 707 
End CSI 1.59 2.58 0 19 707 
      
Violent Start 0.24 0.52 0 3 106 
GP Involvement 0.05 0.23 0 2 22 
Protracted 0.28 0.54 0 3 126 
Grave 0.24 0.49 0 3 106 
War 0.08 0.28 0 2 36 
Violent 0.22 0.48 0 3 96 
 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and sum for all crisis 
variables used in our analysis for the sample period 1975–2001. Crisis denotes the number 
of crises that take place in any month consisting of starting (Start), ongoing, and ending 
(End) crises. Violent Start gives the number of crises that start with a violent act. GP 
involvement is the count of crises that involve great powers. Protracted is the number of 
crises that are part of a protracted conflict. Grave denotes the number of crises that involve 
a threat to existence, a threat of great damage or a territorial threat. Violent crises are crises 
with either serious clashes or full-scale wars and crises in the subgroup War include all 
full-scale wars. The Crisis Severity Index is constructed by adding 1 (for being a crisis) to 
the sum of one each for the six aspects (Violent Start, GP Involvement, Protracted, Grave, 
War, and Violent). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of annual expected returns based on Value Line target prices 
Year N Mean Raw Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 Mean VW Excess  
1975 5571 0.3400 0.1260 0.2477 0.3262 0.4205 0.1858 
1976 5050 0.2986 0.1027 0.2243 0.2875 0.3627 0.1839 
1977 5851 0.2857 0.0930 0.2212 0.2806 0.3457 0.1983 
1978 5860 0.2828 0.0879 0.2210 0.2783 0.3379 0.2001 
1979 5958 0.3105 0.0993 0.2419 0.3100 0.3767 0.1967 
1980 5799 0.3132 0.1211 0.2287 0.3159 0.3971 0.1828 
1981 5974 0.2895 0.0927 0.2252 0.2881 0.3494 0.1420 
1982 6010 0.3121 0.0984 0.2442 0.3073 0.3762 0.1846 
1983 5056 0.1964 0.0731 0.1527 0.2019 0.2437 0.1063 
1984 5610 0.2332 0.0728 0.1863 0.2292 0.2769 0.1197 
1985 4989 0.1972 0.0783 0.1497 0.1908 0.2385 0.1033 
1986 5191 0.1530 0.0710 0.1077 0.1478 0.1919 0.0769 
1987 5292 0.1472 0.0785 0.0988 0.1380 0.1890 0.0588 
1988 5395 0.1875 0.0730 0.1407 0.1801 0.2267 0.1016 
1989 5245 0.1684 0.0701 0.1245 0.1628 0.2055 0.0716 
1990 5196 0.2105 0.0918 0.1437 0.1968 0.2623 0.0951 
1991 5202 0.1909 0.0848 0.1300 0.1786 0.2390 0.1000 
1992 5184 0.1749 0.0803 0.1172 0.1670 0.2210 0.1098 
1993 5292 0.1482 0.0722 0.0966 0.1443 0.1916 0.0975 
1994 5184 0.1569 0.0657 0.1114 0.1539 0.1958 0.0904 
1995 5174 0.1491 0.0611 0.1066 0.1444 0.1845 0.0747 
1996 5067 0.1358 0.0653 0.0907 0.1289 0.1726 0.0582 
1997 5101 0.1207 0.0622 0.0787 0.1137 0.1559 0.0423 
1998 5100 0.1277 0.0813 0.0704 0.1153 0.1722 0.0321 
1999 5328 0.1556 0.0868 0.0954 0.1486 0.2086 0.0439 
2000 5645 0.1869 0.1033 0.1155 0.1830 0.2508 0.0584 
2001 5771 0.1742 0.0926 0.1104 0.1601 0.2221 0.1085 
  
This table provides summary statistics on the distribution of Value Line’s expected annual 
return by year constructed from Value Line target prices. The data, also used in Brav, Lehavy, 
and Michaely (2005), are obtained from Reuven Lehavy’s Web page. The last column reports 
28 
 
the value-weighted average expected returns in excess of one-year constant maturity Treasury 
rates, where the weights are determined by the market capitalizations at the end of the preceding 
month. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for other variables 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean STD Dev Q1 Median Q3 PP P-Value 
Et[MRP] 0.1120 0.0564 0.0691 0.1027 0.1588 0.01 
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] 0.0401 0.0122 0.0306 0.0376 0.0475 0.01 
CSI t-1 8.63 5.74 4.00 9.00 12.00 0.01 
UNCt-1 0.0646 0.0871 0.0144 0.0359 0.0748 0.01 
RGDPt-1 0.0251 0.0135 0.0215 0.0252 0.0311 0.03 
RRELt-1 -0.0004 0.0080 -0.0052 -0.0010 0.0045 0.01 
TERMt-1 0.0013 0.0024 0.0001 0.0012 0.0024 0.01 
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] -4.27 0.50 -4.64 -4.21 -3.92 0.01 
DEFt-1 0.0111 0.0047 0.0076 0.0096 0.0139 0.01 
 
Panel B: Correlations 
 Et[MRP] 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] CSI t-1 UNCt-1 RGDPt-1 RRELt-1 TERMt-1 DEFt-1 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] 
Et[MRP] 1         
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] 0.04 1        
CSI t-1 0.33 0.09 1       
UNCt-1 0.46 0.07 0.08 1      
RGDPt-1 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.24 1     
RRELt-1 0.26 0.21 0.33 0.21 -0.45 1    
30 
 
TERMt-1 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.27 -0.08 1   
DEFt-1 0.47 0.28 0.09 0.31 -0.11 0.09 0.06 1  
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] 0.42 -0.14 0.25 0.29 -0.05 0.10 -0.16 0.29 1 
 
Panel A of this table reports summary statistics for the variables used in this study and Panel B presents the correlation matrix. The sample period 
is 1975 to 2001 with a total of 324 months. Et[MRP] is the value-weighted expected return in excess of one-year constant maturity Treasury yield.  
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] is the expected stock market volatility for month t from an ARIMA(0,1,3) model calculated with information available at the end of 
month t-1. CSI t-1 is previous month’s Crisis Severity Index (CSI). UNCt-1 and RGDPt-1 denote the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of 
the most recent GDP growth rate forecasts, respectively. 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] is the log of the sum of the absolute value of the four preceding quarters’ 
consumption growth AR(1) residuals. RRELt-1 is defined as the three-month T-bill rate minus its trailing twelve-month average. TERMt-1 denotes 
the difference between the six-month and three-month T-bill rates. DEFt-1 is defined as the difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA bond 
yields. PP P-value denotes P-value from Philips-Perron unit root test. Quarterly observations are converted to monthly observations by taking the 
most recently available quarterly observations. Correlation coefficients in bold denote significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 4. Monthly expected market risk premium regressions 
Model  Intercept 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] CSI t-1 UNCt-1 RGDPt-1 RRELt-1 TERMt-1 DEFt-1 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] Adj. R
2 
1 0.1048 0.1797        -0.0016 
 [3.10] [0.24]         
 (0.0000) (0.386)         
2 0.0823 0.0419 0.0032       0.1041 
 [2.89] [0.06] [2.87]        
 (0.0001) (0.4713) (0.0003)        
3 0.0638 -0.0489 0.0029 0.2931 0.2358     0.2951 
 [2.45] [-0.10] [3.03] [3.18] [0.33]      
 (0.0030) (0.4531) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.2973)      
4 0.0612 -0.6957 0.0024   1.2135 3.6524 4.7284  0.2825 
 [2.11] [-1.20] [2.15]   [1.91] [2.91] [3.76]   
 (0.0035) (0.0661) (0.0021)   (0.0275) (0.0068) (0.0000)   
5 0.2574 0.3168 0.0023      0.0416 0.2293 
 [3.10] [0.67] [2.16]      [2.38]  
 (0.0000) (0.2533) (0.0053)        
6 0.1728 -0.3380 0.0018 0.1922 0.3941 1.1228 3.8694 2.8912 0.0283 0.4425 
 [2.67] [-0.82] [1.97] [3.17] [0.61] [2.40] [3.26] [2.42] [2.18]  
 (0.0002) (0.1920) (0.0060) (0.0000) (0.1567) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0028)  
 
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of Value Line analysts’ expected returns in excess of one-year constant-maturity Treasury rates 
on lagged variables named at the head of the columns. The returns are value-weighted using the preceding month’s market capitalization. Newey–
West corrected t-statistics with the optimal bandwidth proposed by Andrews (1991) in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. The sample 
period is 1975–2001. In brackets are one-sided bootstrap p-values from 10,000 iterations. All variable definitions are identical to Table 3. 
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Table 5. Monthly E/P and D/P regressions 
# Intercept 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] CSI t-1 UNCt-1 RGDPt-1 RRELt-1 TERMt-1 DEFt-1  𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] Adj. R
2 Begin End 
Panel A: E/P  
1 0.0549 0.2976         0.0525 1926.02 2008.12 
 [6.49] [2.80]            
2 0.0454 0.2950 0.0013        0.1258 1928.02 2008.12 
 [6.18] [2.22] [2.93]           
3 0.0472 -0.0274 0.0012 0.1918 -0.0234      0.3091 1968.12 2008.12 
 [3.17] [-0.09] [2.21] [2.96] [-0.09]         
4 0.0245 -0.3248 0.0013   0.3751 0.4209 3.7434   0.3632 1959.01 2008.12 
 [2.72] [-1.01] [2.20]   [0.83] [0.85] [4.88]      
5 0.1288 0.2695 0.0012       0.0200 0.2393 1948.07 2008.12 
 [5.18] [0.83] [2.38]       [4.22]    
6 0.0985 -0.2977 0.0009 0.1266 -0.0215 0.2038 0.9675 3.1956  0.0167 0.5459 1968.12 2008.12 
 [2.42] [-1.32] [1.75] [2.83] [-0.13] [0.83] [2.28] [3.59]  [2.21]    
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Panel B: D/P  
1 0.0261 0.3269        0.0261 0.1388 1926.02 2008.12 
 [4.38] [2.69]        [4.38]    
2 0.0225 0.3259 0.0005       0.0225 0.1612 1928.02 2008.12 
 [3.92] [2.53] [1.92]       [3.92]    
3 0.0281 -0.0907 0.0006 0.0790 -0.0830     0.0281 0.3470 1968.12 2008.12 
 [4.64] [-0.67] [2.79] [3.00] [-0.92]     [4.64]    
4 0.0215 -0.2322 0.0006   0.2934 0.3743 1.2859  0.0215 0.3106 1959.01 2008.12 
 [4.85] [-1.54] [2.43]   [1.71] [1.93] [3.98]  [4.85]    
5 0.0897 -0.0503 0.0005      0.0137 0.0897 0.3431 1948.07 2008.12 
 [5.47] [-0.37] [2.25]      [4.14] [5.47]    
6 0.0502 -0.1930 0.0005 0.0541 -0.0762 0.1300 0.5610 1.1044 0.0067 0.0502 0.5296 1968.12 2008.12 
 [3.14] [-1.85] [2.31] [2.82] [-1.12] [1.27] [3.59] [3.29] [2.21] [3.14]    
 
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of E/P and D/P on lagged variables named at the head of a column. E/P is the 10-year trailing 
average of real earnings divided by real price. D/P is real dividends in the preceding year divided by real price. Newey–West corrected t-statistics 
with 12 lags appear in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. The sample periods vary with data availability and are shown in the last two 
columns. All variable definitions are identical to Table 3. 
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Table 6. Quarterly expected market risk premium regressions 
# Intercept 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] Et-1[CSI] UNCt-1 RGDPt-1 RRELt-1 TERMt-1 DEFt-1  𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] Adj. R
2 
1 0.0993 0.3044         -0.0050 
 [3.30] [0.47]          
2 0.0799 0.2169 0.0026        0.0739 
 [4.33] [0.50] [3.17]         
3 0.0588 0.0390 0.0027 0.3174 0.2877      0.3074 
 [3.05] [0.10] [3.70] [6.09] [0.85]       
4 0.0631 -0.5477 0.0018   1.5960 2.2224 4.4254   0.2282 
 [3.23] [-1.29] [2.27]   [2.77] [1.44] [3.83]    
5 0.2635 0.4551 0.0018       0.0435 0.2207 
 [6.03] [1.14] [2.35]       [4.56]  
6 0.1740 -0.2170 0.0015 0.2290 0.5088 1.3260 2.9054 2.4076  0.0292 0.4448 
 [3.97] [-0.59] [2.15] [4.61] [1.54] [2.45] [2.15] [2.33]  [3.28]  
 
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of Value Line analysts’ expected returns in excess of one-year constant-maturity T-bill rates on 
lagged variables named at the head of a column. The returns are measured quarterly and are value-weighted using the preceding quarter’s market 
capitalization. Newey–West corrected t-statistics with four lags appear in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. The sample period is 
1975–2001. All variable definitions are identical to those in Table 3. Monthly series are converted to quarterly series by taking the most recent 
observation. 
  
Table 7. Granger Causality Tests 
 
  CSI Caused  CSI Causing 
 Lag Length F-stat P-value  F-stat P-value 
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑚] 3 0.0389 0.9898  1.9098 0.1259 
UNCt-1 1 2.1177 0.1466  7.7119 0.0058 
RGDPt-1 1 0.0072 0.9324  2.5953 0.1082 
RRELt-1 1 2.6715 0.1023  1.6399 0.2005 
TERMt-1 3 0.3292 0.8043  1.5330 0.2042 
DEFt-1 2 0.9006 0.4065  0.3917 0.6760 
𝐸𝑡−1[𝑙𝑛𝜎𝑐] 2 0.1427 0.8671  1.3350 0.2647 
 
This table reports the results of Granger causality tests from bivariate Vector 
Autoregressive Regressions with the CSI and the economic variables listed. We select the 
lag lengths that optimize the four goodness-of-fit measures - Akaike information criterion, 
Hannan-Quinn information criterion, final prediction error, and Schwarz criterion. When 
there is an equal division among the measures we pick the shorter length.  
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Figure 1.  Expected market risk premium and predicted crisis severity index 
 
 
This figure plots the value-weighted analysts’ expected returns of individual firms in excess 
of one-year constant maturity T-bill rates and the previous month’s Crisis Severity Index 
(CSI). The expected return of an individual firm is defined as the rate of return that equates 
the current market price of a stock to the present value of the target price expected to prevail 
in four years’ time and future dividends. CSI is the sum of six political indicator values. 
Each point in the figure represents an annual average of the monthly figures within the 
same calendar year. 
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Figure 2. Realized market risk premium and predicted crisis severity index 
 
 
 
This figure plots the annualized CRSP value-weighted stock market returns in excess of 
30-day T-bill rates and the previous month’s Crisis Severity Index (CSI). CSI is the sum 
of six political indicator values. Each point in the figure represents an annual average of 
the monthly figures within the same calendar year. 
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